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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David McPeak appeals from his conviction for burglary, and possession of
controlled substances (methamphetamine and marijuana), following a jury trial.
McPeak challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence found
and seized during an investigative detention. McPeak also contends his sevenyear fixed sentence was excessive.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged McPeak with one felony count of burglary, one felony
count of aggravated assault, one felony count of possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), and one misdemeanor count of possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana).

(R., pp. 19-21.)

McPeak filed a motion to

suppress, asserting that the search and seizure of his vehicle had been illegal.
(R., pp. 33-39, 40-47, 61-63.) The state responded that McPeak had voluntarily
stopped his vehicle, and police were justified in detaining McPeak and searching
his vehicle based on the totality of circumstances. (R., pp. 52-59.)
The district court made the following oral findings of fact at the
suppression hearing:
[T]he officer actually didn't initiate a stop. The defendant
himself stopped, and the officer stopped behind him. At that point
when the spotlight goes on, I suppose at that point there's a
detention. And then of course when the overhead lights go on it
seems clear that he's being detained at that time. . .. [The officer]
had reported to him that there was an assault at a location,
although not a block away it's within the vicinity, that the vehicle
leaving the scene was a white Ford
50 vehicle which he
stopped behind. There were unusual behavior[s] going on with this
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Ford pickup, that is it slowed to 15 miles an hour speed in a
mile
an hour zone, turned the corner and slowed
five miles an hour
and actually stopped, and then there was all sorts of movement
inside the pickup which is all indicative of maybe there's criminal
activity afoot.
He's detained them for 30 seconds to a minute until the
other officers arrive. They're asked to exit the vehicle. And,
indeed, this defendant is identified as David McPeak, who
apparently the person assaulted identified specifically as being
David McPeak.
So now at this point in time the officer does have evidence
to support detention and also sees in plain sight three knives in the
vehicle, which again he was informed that there was a knife used in
this assault, so seizing those knives would be consistent with his
ability to search the vehicle for evidence of this assault that
occurred earlier.
During the course of this search he smells even the faint
odor of marijuana.
(11/13/12 Tr., p. 52, L. 16 - p. 53, L. 24.) The court concluded that police were
allowed "at least to search for other contraband, other illegal drugs in the
vehicle." (11/13/12 Tr., p. 54., Ls. 2-5.) The court further concluded the officer
had "the ability given the probable cause of the assault to search the vehicle
further for any other weapons that might be evidence of this crime of assault that
occurred earlier in the evening."

(11/13/12 Tr., p. 54, Ls. 5-9.)

The court

therefore denied McPeak's motion to suppress. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 54, Ls. 10-11.)
The court also denied McPeak's motion to dismiss. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 63,
1.) The matter proceeded to trial, and - relevant to this appeal - a jury found
McPeak guilty of burglary and possession of methamphetamine and marijuana;
the jury found him not guilty of aggravated assault. (R., pp. 137-39.) The court
sentenced McPeak to a unified term of ten years in prison with seven years fixed
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on the felony burglary count, and an indeterminate term of seven years on the
felony possession of methamphetamine count, to run consecutively.

(R., pp.

194, 198-99, 211-13.) The court also retained jurisdiction. (R., p. 194.) On the
misdemeanor count of possession of marijuana, the court ordered McPeak to
serve 180 days in jail with credit for 180 days served. (R., p. 200.)
McPeak timely appealed. (R., pp. 201-03.)
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ISSUES

McPeak

on appeal as:

1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McPeak's motion
to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing
excessive sentences?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1

Has McPeak failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that the
detention, search, and seizure of contraband from McPeak's vehicle was
justified?

2.

Has McPeak failed to show the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
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ARGUMENT
McPeak Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion That The
Detention, Search, And Seizure Of Contraband From His Vehicle Was Justified
A.

Introduction
McPeak argues the police lacked iegal justification "to initiate a traffic

stop," therefore the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-11.) Given the totality of the circumstances found by the
district court and substantially supported by the investigating officer's testimony,
McPeak was validly detained.

McPeak does not challenge the validity of the

subsequent search and seizure, except to argue the seized evidence should be
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) Accordingly,
this Court should affirm the order denying McPeak's motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a decision on a suppression motion is challenged, the appellate

court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,
_, 301 P.3d 242, 251 (2013). The appellate court first accepts the trial court's
factual findings

are supported by substantial evidence, then freely reviews

the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

C.

&

Given The Totality Of The Circumstances, The Detention Of McPeak's
Vehicle Was Legally Justified
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
State v. Anderson, 1

Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012).
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or the search was "otherwise reasonable under
Johnson, 1

circumstances."

State v.

Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Ct. App. 2011) (citation

omitted). Under the automobile exception, a police officer may search a vehicle
if there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime.

19.:.

(citing

State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991).) Also, an
officer is entitled to conduct an investigatory

if the officer "observes conduct

which leads to the reasonable conclusion that 'criminal

afoot."'

131 Idaho 550,553,961 P.2d 641,644 (1998) (citation omitted);
also Terry v. 01 nu, :::

'

1

(1968).

"A reasonable-suspicion determination 'need not rise to the level required
for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance
of the evidence standard."' State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 126, 233 P.3d 52, 57
(2010) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). Reasonable
suspicion is more than speculation or an inchoate hunch about criminal activity,
but must be based on articulable facts - considering the totality of circumstances
- that the one being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. State v. Bordeaux, 148
Idaho 1, 6, 217 P.3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Widner,

Idaho_, 317

P.3d 737, 741 (2013); State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675
(Ct. App. 2010).
The totality of the circumstances confronting the officer here provided
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The officer testified he was
alerted about an assault involving a knife that occurred in the general direction
where he was heading.

(11/13/12 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 19-21; p. 20, L. 10.)
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The

dispatch call identified the suspect as David McPeak, and indicated McPeak ieft
the scene of his assault in a white Ford truck. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 15-17.)
The officer testified he spotted a white Ford pickup and pulled behind it - without
activating any special lights -to read its license plate. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 911, 20-21; p. 19, Ls. 6-8.) When he pulled behind the truck it slowed down to 15
miles per hour, abruptly turned off Indiana Avenue onto Maple Street without
signaling, slowed again to five miles per hour, and then stopped on the side of
the road. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 18, L. 25 - p. 19, L. 5.) The officer shined a spotlight
on the truck and saw its occupants "shifting around a lot, so I activated my lights"
to detain the occupants as a "high risk traffic stop." (11/13/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 1120.) These articulable facts sufficiently demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that
the truck's occupants were or had been engaged in criminal activity.
Arguing otherwise, McPeak cites State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703,
169 P.3d 291 (Ct. App. 2007). In that case, a caller - concerned about drive-by
shootings - informed police a car had driven past his house twice that evening.

kl at 705, 169 P.3d at 293. The caller described the car as "a white passenger
car, maybe a Corsica or a Buick, and did not include a license plate number."

kl

at 708, 169 P.3d at 296. The caller did not "indicate how much time had passed
since the suspicious vehicle had last driven past his house."

~

at 705, 169 P.3d

at 293. The Court of Appeals in that case determined that "the officers did not
possess a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Zapata-Reyes had
committed or was about to commit a crime."
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Id.

But the totality of the

circumstances

here,

in

contrast to

Zapata-Reyes,

provided

more

than

speculation or an inchoate hunch that McPeak was involved in criminal activity.
The totality of circumstances in McPeak's case included that the suspect
car was a white Ford truck, but also that the officer observed suspicious driving
behavior (slowing and coming to a stop despite that the officer did not activate
overhead lights).

(11/13/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 1-8.) After the truck stopped, the

occupants' movements were "almost like they were trying to hide something or
stuff stuff under their seat." (11/13/12 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 6-9.) In addition, the officer
was advised that the driver of the white Ford truck was suspected of assault
· ;;) - •.,--. .••.,... ,,...,,eel"'

11,

/;:..o;:,,e-Reves, 144 Idaho at 705, 169 P.3d at 293,

the defendant was detained on suspicion of having driven by a house twice
which, without more, is not a criminal activity. (11/13/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 16-17.)
Comparing the circumstances, Zapata-Reyes is factually distinguishable.
McPeak also cites State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,294 P.3d 1121 (2013).
In Morgan, a police officer conducted a traffic stop after observing Morgan make
four left-hand turns.

kt at

111, 294 P.3d at 1123. McPeak likens Morgan's four

turns to McPeak's slow-down, turn, slow-down and stop.

(Appellant's brief, p.

10.) But again, the officer's reasonable suspicion here was based on more than
McPeak's suspicious driving behavior alone.

Thus, Morgan is factually

distinguishable as well.
The reasonable-suspicion inquiry requires consideration of the totality of
circumstances, not one circumstance, or a partial circumstance.

Widner,

Idaho at _, 317 P.3d at 741; Horton, 150 Idaho at 302, 246 P.3d at 675;
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Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 6, 217 P.3d at 6.

McPeak's case is factually more

similar to other cases in which the denials of motions to suppress were affirmed
on finding that the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion warranting
a suspect's detention, based on the totality of multiple circumstances. See State
v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 656-57, 262 P.3d 682, 685-86 (Ct. App. 2011) (officer
was in general area to which suspects had been running, defendant's attire
matched description of suspect and walked briskly); State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho
470, 474-75, 210 P.3d 578, 582-83 (Ct. App. 2009) (officer responding to
dispatch about an armed robbery that had just occurred, had reasonable and
articulable suspicion to detain suspects who he observed driving at suspiciously
slow rate of speed, and "jumping around or moving around in [the] car really
fast); Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8, 217 P.3d at 8 (detention of vehicle at border was
justified where the vehicle matched the description of suspect vehicle, and
vehicle was spotted 15-20 minutes after the information was relayed by the
customs official).
Here, as in those cases, there were multiple circumstances before the
officer that, when considered in totality, justified Mcpeak's detention. The officer
had more than mere speculation or a hunch, but a reasonable suspicion that
McPeak was involved - or had been - in criminal activity. McPeak has failed to
show error in the district court's conclusion the officer had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to detain McPeak's vehicle.

Therefore, the Court should

reject McPeak's argument and affirm the order denying the motion to suppress.
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II.
McPeak Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Introduction
McPeak does not dispute that his sentence was within statutory limits, but
argues it was excessive and an abuse of the sentencing court's discretion.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.)

Applying Idaho's well-established standard of

review for an excessive-sentence challenge, McPeak fails to satisfy his appellate
burden.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits

absent a clear showing of abuse.

State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253

P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). In reviewing for abuse of discretion, the
appellate court considers whether the district court (1) was aware its decision
was discretionary, (2) acted within the scope of its discretion and consistent with
applicable law, and (3) reached its decision through exercise of reason. State v.
Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011 ). To meet his burden on
appeal, McPeak must show his sentence is excessive "under any reasonable
view of the facts," considering the primary objective of criminal punishment protecting society - as well as the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and
retribution. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876-77, 253 P.3d at 313-14.
In

reviewing

an

excessive

sentence

claim,

the

appellate

court

independently reviews the record, examining "the nature of the offense, the
offender's character and the protection of the public interest." State v. Delling,
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152 Idaho 122, 132, 267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) (citation omitted).

Where

reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sentence is excessive, the

appellate court will not disturb it.
(citation omitted).

Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941

Stated another way, the court on appeal "will set aside the

sentence only where reasonable minds could not differ as to the excessiveness
of the sentence."

State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974

(2005).
For purposes of its review, the appellate court "considers the fixed term of
confinement as the sentence imposed."

hl:

(citing State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho

791,797, 69 P.3d 1052, 1058 (2003).)

C.

McPeak Has Failed To Show His Seven-Year Fixed Term Is Excessive
Under Any Reasonable View Of The Facts
McPeak cites, as mitigating factors, that he said he was sorry for having

lost his temper and yelled at Angela Marsh, and that he told the court he "did not
drink, smoke or use alcohol." (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14 (citing 3/21/13 Tr., p.
41, Ls. 10-13; p. 43, Ls. 22-25).)

McPeak also states that he owned two

businesses, had strong job skills in many fields, and that he believed he would
have employment and a place to stay if released.

(Appellant's brief, p. 13.)

None of these factors, even if credible and taken together, demonstrate that his
seven-year fixed sentence is excessive, in light of the information before the
sentencing court.
In the presentence investigation (PSI) report, the investigator noted that
McPeak admitted yelling at Angela Marsh after "kicking in" her door, and
acknowledged he has "anger management problems." (PSI, pp. 4, 17, 20-21.)
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Marsh had reported to police
and held a
"I

kill

near her
" (PSI,

dating back to 1981.

McPeak kicked in her front

stormed

yelling that her husband had stolen his tools and

3.) The PSI details McPeak's 31-year criminal history,
(PSI, pp. 4-11.)

A court-ordered substance abuse

assessment could not be completed "due to [McPeak's] uncooperative behavior."
(PSI, p. 20.)
At sentencing, the district court stated, "one of the factors the court has to

consider is the protection of community." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 50, Ls. 22-23.) The
court continued,

"when presented with somebody with such anger, and

sometimes misplaced anger, the court has to be concerned about the protection
of the community, and I am." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 50,

23 - p. 51, L. 1.) The court

expressed that rehabilitative programs are geared toward younger offenders
rather than 49-50 year olds such as McPeak. (3/21/13 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 2-9.) The
court stated, "I think your attitude and your anger really places you in bad stead
with the courts, with law enforcement, and if you don't get on top of it then really
the only protection for the community is to place you in prison." (3/21/13 Tr., p.
51, Ls. 17-21.) The court then added that it was "very skeptical that you have
the ability to control that anger as you said that you do." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 51,
21-23.)
The court imposed a ten-year term with seven years fixed as to the
burglary charge, and a consecutive indeterminate term of seven years on the
possession of methamphetamine charge.

(3/21/13 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 7-15.) The

court retained jurisdiction, saying, 'Tm going to have you evaluated by the

12

Department of Corrections, and they can decide which is the appropriate
programming that you go through.

And if you successfully complete the

programming, the court will consider probation." (3/21/13 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 16-21.)
The court summarized:
... what I'm doing effectively is giving you an opportunity to get on
top of your anger, which is really what the court considers your risk
to the community. And if you don't, the court will be relinquishing
jurisdiction, and you're going to be looking at that lengthy prison
sentence. But I'm placing you in control, and you need to take
advantage of it
(3/21/13 Tr., p. 52, L 22 - p. 53, L. 4.) The court's comments demonstrate its
focus on the primary objective of criminal punishment - protecting society. Also,
the court addressed

McPeak's rehabilitative potential,

leaving open the

possibility of probation if McPeak seized his opportunity to successfully engage
in programming. McPeak has failed to show that under any reasonable view of
the facts, the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore this Court should

reject his argument.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the order denying

McPeak's motion to suppress, the judgment of conviction, and McPeak's
sentence.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2014.

~~

DAPHNEiHLJAN~
Deputy Attorney General
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